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I very much appreciate the high honor you have done me. Indeed,
it is a source of particular pleasure that this great urban University
has chosen to award me its Doctor of Laws degree in this historically
significant centennial year.
You undoubtedly recall that Emperor Charles V granted the
Island of Malta to the Knights of St. John in the 16th century and that
they then adopted the title of the Knights of Malta. With this historical
bit in mind, I would tell you a story, probably apocryphal, about the
early days of St. John's University. An applicant for admission, when
asked why he was so eager to attend St. John's, replied that he had read
a great deal about the University and had always possessed a strong
desire to visit Malta. Today, of course, it is highly unlikely that anyone
would be unaware of St. John's location, for the University has a
reputation not only in this State but throughout the country for
scholastic achievement -and, if I may say so, on the athletic field as
well.
It is sufficient, I think, in speaking of the University's accomplishments over the past century, simply to say that they have been significant and that its School of Law has contributed greatly to those
accomplishments. Your Law School has a history, a record of achievement, of which all associated with it must be very proud. Its graduates
include those who have gone on to become leading members of the bar
and captains of industry and business as well as those who, in large
numbers, have devoted themselves to the public service as legislators
and judges. In fact, it is interesting to note, there are 84 St. John's
alumni who are now serving as judges on courts throughout the State.
I shall speak to you briefly of a matter about which many have
tThis address by Chief Judge FuId was given on March 21, 1970 at St. John's
University School of Law upon receiving the Doctor of Laws degree.
* Chief Judge of the State of New York.
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written and more have talked - the right to dissent. Although I realize
that little can be added to what has already been said, the subject is
particularly timely today when dissent and protest, assuming a new
guise, have invaded the courtroom.
The decade just concluded has witnessed a procession of events,
separate but related, dramatically posing the question whether our
society, which has traditionally relied on legislative and judicial processes as the media for change, can accommodate to the concept of civil
disobedience as a means to a desired end. Thus, there have been civil
rights marches, anti-war protests, draft card burnings, university sit-ins
- some of which are legal, indeed, constitutionally protected, activities, while others are deliberate violations of law designed to dramatize
opposition to authority or even to compel a change in policy with the
threat of disruption. Taken together, these highly publicized forms of
protest have produced an atmosphere in which even issues which were
once debated calmly have taken on explosive dimensions. It is true, of
course, that there have been other manifestations of unrest in our
history, but I venture to say that neither in scope nor in intensity did
those occurrences prepare us for the confrontations and social cataclysms of the present day.
Underlying such phenomena, both past and present, has been the
element of protest: protest against racial discrimination and social and
economic maladjustment, protest against governmental policy, protest
against educational programs and university authority and protest
against our entire political system. From Henry Thoreau, who refused
to pay a poll tax because it would support a state government committed to enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law' to Martin Luther
2
King, who saw injustice anywhere as "a threat to justice everywhere,"
to the present day, public protest has served as a major vehicle for the
expression of dissent.
In point of fact the right to publicly proclaim one's dissent is truly
part of our heritage. It is an integral aspect of the freedom of thought and
expression which is basic to our democratic system of government, and
it must be preserved, protected and cherished. But a protest which goes
beyond the expression of dissent or disagreement -whose
object is
coercion rather than persuasion -cannot
be justified. Just as the
violent suppression of legitimate dissent is wrong and intolerable, so
too it is equally wrong and intolerable for the expression of dissent to
take the form of violence or incitement to violence, of interference
1 H.

THORFAU, ON CiviL DISOBEDIENCE 229 (New Am. Library ed. 1960).
2 King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, NEw LUEAD,
April 22, 1968, at 3.
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with the rights of others. Simply put, there is no room for dissent which
violates the rule of law. Such dissent not only transcends the bounds of
constitutionally protected individual liberty but, since its aim is to
destroy the rights of others, it represents a repudiation of the very
principle of individual liberty on which it is purportedly premised. In
the words of Judge Learned Hand, liberty is not license. As he declared:
it is not freedom to do as one likes. That is the denial of liberty,
and leads straight to its overthrow. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where
freedom is the possession of only a savage few ....
Because of this, those who are interested in the preservation of
our liberties and of our democratic system must, of necessity, be concerned about the disruptive and obstructive tactics which a few unruly
defendants have recently employed in our courtrooms. Although isolated instances of such behavior may not really pose a threat to the
administration of justice today, continued resort to those tactics on any
substantial scale could seriously hamper the operation of our courts and
thereby frustrate the vital purpose they serve. In very fact, our laws
and the judicial system stand as the bulwarks of our liberties. It has
been aptly said that a capable and fair judicial system is, indeed, "[t]he
only real alternative which a democracy has to violent dissent and
armed revolution." 4
If anything is clear, it is that we cannot countenance the substitution of deliberately fomented disorder and calculated disruption of
order, dignity and respect for the law and the courts which administer
the law. The attainment of evenhanded justice and fairness demands
that the judicial process be conducted in a calm and dispassionate
atmosphere. As the late President Kennedy declared in September of
1962 - though in a somewhat different context our nation is founded on the principle that observance of the law
is the eternal safeguard of liberty and defiance of the law is the
surest road to tyranny .... in a government of laws and not of
men, no man... and no mob, however unruly or boisterous, is
entitled to defy a court of law. If this country should ever reach the
point where any man or group of men ... could long deny the
commands of our court and our Constitution, then no law would
stand free from doubt, no judge would be sure of his writ and no
citizen would be safe from his neighbors. 5
8L.

HAND, T

Spnrr OF LiERTY 190 (1960).
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4 1970 CATALOr OF TinNATONAL CoLI.n
5N.Y. Times, Oct. 1,1962, at 22, col. 6.
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No grievance, however meritorious, which dissenters and protesters
on trial may have, can possibly justify the degeneration of courtroom
proceedings "into a chaos of deliberate insults and purposeful disruption."" Nor can there be any warrant for their attempted use of the
courtroom as a forum for propaganda or for the expression of views,
political or otherwise, which have no relevance whatsoever to the matters in issue before the court. Defendants who very properly insist upon
their right to a fair trial do themselves and the cause they espouse, as
well as the administration of justice, a disservice by resorting to disorderly and contemptuous behavior deliberately intended to render the
judicial process ineffectual.
There are numerous important constitutional safeguards which
our courts scrupulously enforce for the protection of a defendant's
rights. They are designed to assure a fair trial for every defendant,
regardless of who he is or the views he holds. These safeguards are
rarely disregarded at the trial level, but, if they are, there are appellate
courts to which recourse may be had and corrections effected. In brief,
our judicial system is one which rests on reason and on the concept of
fairness for all, and it does not lie within the competence of any person,
dissenter or non-dissenter, layman or lawyer, to destroy that tried and
tested system, whatever may be his political motivation or how deep
his antipathy to the existing social order.
I am hopeful -

despite predictions to the contrary -

that appro-

priate restraining influence will be exercised by counsel and that any
lawyer who is faithful to his oath and the canons of professional responsibility will be able to persuade his client to desist from unruly
and objectionable conduct and rely, instead, on reasoned appeal to
those who must pass upon his cause - the trial judge and jury in the
first instance and, in the event of a conviction, the appellate courts.
Surely, a reasonably intelligent defendant, no matter how disenchanted
with our way of life or with our political system, must, if properly
advised, realize that it is to his own best interests that the trial be left
in the hands of counsel so that his defense may be most clearly and
strongly presented.
Let us suppose, though, that some incidents of disorderly and
obstructionist tactics continue. What is to be done? Although there
are no ready answers, many and varied suggestions have been advanced
as to how to deal with the problem. All of them deserve to be explored
but, in appraising their worth and endeavoring to find an appropriate
solution, we must be mindful that some raise constitutional questions.
6 N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1970, at 42, col. 2.
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We must remember, too, that under our system of justice a fair trial
cannot be waived and that we must protect the defendant against injustice despite his own efforts to render justice difficult to achieve. We
must be careful, therefore, not to adopt measures which would themselves offend against constitutional guarantees and threaten the integrity and dignity of the judicial process as well. In other words, excess
must be answered not by excess but by reason and a due regard for the
constitutional compact which binds us all. Moreover, not only must we
do our utmost to assure that our judicial and political processes are
responsive to the needs of our times, but we must also seek out the causes
for the disaffection upon which those who challenge our system of government and justice batten. We have, to be sure, made some progress
in the past years in this direction but much more remains to be done
to convince all of our citizens that they have a stake in this society.
But, nonetheless, one thing is clear. Defendants cannot be allowed
to turn court proceedings into a shambles. Order and decorum there
must be if there is to be a meaningful trial. The issue is joined between
the rule of law and anarchy. Needless to say, as one thoughtful legal
philosopher -Professor Harry W. Jones of Columbia Law School has put it, we cannot allow violence or anarchy to
undermine the structure of ordered liberty that men of law have
[P]rivate indibuilt and maintained for the many centuries ....
viduals and private groups [may not] choose the laws they will
obey as they choose the shirts they buy, liking this one and rejecting the next. For then, as the contagion spreads, there is no law.
And where there is no law, there is no liberty. And where there is
no liberty, the people perish.7
Before bringing these remarks to a close, may I tell you that, in
order to insure the single end we all desire, I am asking the Presiding
fellow members of
Justices of the several Appellate Divisions -my
the Administrative Board -to join with me in a joint effort to devise
solutions to the challenge of calculated disruption of courtroom proceedings with which we have been confronted. Mindful of constitutional obligations, we shall seek to establish guidelines which will
assure a fair trial, courtroom decorum and the continued viability of
the judicial process."
7 H. JoNEs, THE EFFICACY OF LAW 102 (1968).
00 [Ed. note.] On March 31, 1970, ten days after Chief Judge Fuld delivered his address, the Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), forcefully sought to resolve the problems created by obstreperous defendants. While recognizing that the sixth
amendment grants an accused the right to be confronted with witnesses against him, the
Court held this privilege may be lost by a defendant's misconduct.
[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned
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by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive,
and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the
courtroom.
Id. at 337.
As alternatives to banishing the unruly defendant, the judge may utilize the traditional weapon of criminal contempt, or keep the defendant under control by binding and
gagging him. Hopefully, judicious use of these methods will alleviate the untenable
situation created by consciously disruptive defendants.

